Khomeini’s Role Behind the Hostage Crisis from Beginning to End – Part 6
Why Was the Algiers Accord Signed So Hastily?
The nature of the Republicans, under Reagan’s leadership and his allies, was hardly a secret to anyone even slightly familiar with Western politics. Those who pretended that Democrats and Republicans were essentially the same knew this wasn’t true. Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. represent two overarching currents in domestic and foreign policy, and while they share common stances on some issues, such as supporting Israel, their policies and methods often differ significantly.
During his election speeches, Reagan consistently blamed Carter for the hostage crisis, calling Iranians “barbarians, extortionists, and lawbreakers” who completely disregarded international laws. Figures such as Rafsanjani, Rajai, Beheshti, Behzad Nabavi, and those in parliament who claimed there was no difference between Reagan and Carter were, in fact, misleading themselves and the Iranian people. Their actions in agreeing to sign the Algiers Accord—a document prepared for them in Washington—reveal the dishonesty. As the late Engineer Bazargan put it:
“Considering Carter’s eagerness to use the release of hostages for his reelection campaign, favorable conditions were created. Carter expressed his readiness to accept the four solid and reasonable conditions proposed by the Imam. However, the obstinacy of extremist elements and deliberate delays by the parliament and government postponed the decision so much that by the time the Carter administration left office, Iran lost all leverage. Ultimately, under hasty and broken agreements brokered by the Algerians, the hostages were released under the most disadvantageous—if not harmful—terms.” (۹۸)
Reagan, however, keen to distance himself from any covert dealings with Iran, stated in his first press conference after being elected president: “Carter is still handling all negotiations regarding the hostages, and I urge all governments to recognize that Carter is the sole negotiator.” He added, “I will do my best to ensure the hostages’ release, but I will not interfere in the delicate ongoing negotiations of the Carter administration.” (۹۹)
While the Algerian delegation negotiated with American officials in Washington on December 29, 1980, Reagan declared, “I will never agree to Iran’s demands.” (۱۰۰) Earlier, on December 23, 1980, he fiercely criticized Iran, calling Iranians kidnappers who had violated international laws by detaining innocent individuals for so long. (101)
Inside Iran, those involved in the deal understood the nature of Reagan’s Republican leadership. Their fear of Reagan was later openly acknowledged by Behzad Nabavi, who admitted, “Had the hostage crisis not been resolved during Carter’s presidency, it’s highly likely Reagan would have treated the Islamic Republic the same way the U.S. treats Iraq today.” (۱۰۲)
Later, Nabavi explained:
“The late Prime Minister Rajai and I reluctantly took on this perilous task, knowing that if we did not volunteer, the crisis might remain unresolved and the revolution and the country could face significant risks.” (۱۰۳)
Thus, after prolonged delays, the Iranian delegation informed the U.S. government of their conditions for the hostages’ release on November 3, 1980. They hurriedly worked to resolve the crisis before Reagan assumed office, as they feared Reagan’s presidency could lead to heightened domestic opposition and the exposure of their dealings.
In summary, the Algiers Accord, signed under pressure and disadvantageous terms, became a pivotal moment. The hostage crisis became entangled with internal power struggles, leading to the undermining of figures like Bazargan, Bani-Sadr, and other opponents of Khomeini’s absolute authority.
Khomeini’s infamous statement that the hostage crisis was a revolution greater than the first one reveals the calculated intent behind the crisis. However, by November 1980, the “second revolution” had become a dead issue. Khomeini, along with his allies in the Republican Party and government, had achieved their goals: the ousting of Bazargan’s administration, the suppression of liberal and opposition forces, and consolidating power under the framework of absolute clerical rule.
The legacy of this crisis extended far beyond the hostages’ release, leaving a trail of political, economic, and international consequences that Iran continues to grapple with. As Bazargan aptly put it, “The Algiers Accord remains a national betrayal—a truth I will never abandon.”